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NOTES

POTENTIALITIES OF EQUAL PROTECTION AS AN
IMPLEMENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The basic equality of man has been one of the most persistent and
frustrated hopes of a large segment of the civilized world since the beginning of written history. In this country expression of this hope early
made its appearance in the Declaration of Independence' and was later
2
incorporated into the Constitution by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Equality as a concept, of course, can and undoubtedly has meant many
different things as the problems and social conditions within our society
change. It has been convincingly contended that the original intention
of the authors of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was to impose an obligation upon the States to protect the basic
rights of the Negro race.3 Since that time the scope of the clause has
broadened and a change in orientation taken place so that today it has
come to require that the imposition of burdens or distribution of bene4
fits be done in a reasonable and rational manner.
1. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Declaration of Independence adopted
by the Continental Congress in Philadelphia on July 4, 1776.
2. The language of the 14th Amendment to which reference is made here is as
follows: "Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
3. "The equal protection clause was, with the foregoing qualification (that the
interpretations made are those of the reconstruction decade and not of any particular
year), originally understood to mean the following: all men, without regard to race
or color, would have the same rights to acquire real and personal property and to enter
into business enterprises; criminal and civil law, in procedures or penalties, should make
no distinctions whatsoever because of race or color; there should be no segregation of
individuals on the basis of race or color as to the right to own or use land; there should
be no segregation of individuals on the basis of race or color in the use of utilities,
such as transportation or hotels; with reservations, for here there is substantial divergence, there should be no segregation in the schools." Frank and Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COL. L. Rxv. 131, 167-8 (1950);
Mr. Justice Miller expressed the opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S.
1873) that the clause was clearly a provision for the benefit of the negro race. See note
40 infra. In contrast to this is the background of equal protection clauses in many state
constitutions. "The persistent theme of the limitations written into state constitutions
after the 1840's was the desire to curb special privilege. The trend began with general
or detailed prohibitions on the enactment of special and local legislation." HURST, THE
The Indiana Constitution provides: "The
GROWTH OF A1FmICAN LAW 241 (1950).
General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." IND. CNST.
Art. I, § 23.
4. If rationality of the classification is accepted as the essence of equal protection,
then the area of equal protection coverage is broadened to cover types of regulatory
classification not traditionally covered. See pp. 193, 197, 201 infra.
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The increased acceptance in contemporary society of the propriety
and necessity of economic regulation has lead some legal scholars to
suggest the possibility of an increased and broadened application of the
equal protection clause as an implement of judicial review in the area
of economic regulation. 5 Others have suggested that equal protection
review be directly substituted for due process review. 6 Equal protection review is considered appropriate here because it supposedly involves
only a consideration of the rationality and fairness of the regulatory
classifications and does not constitute a challenge to the basic validity
of the regulatory purpose as due process purportedly does. 7
Should a court wish to subject economic regulation to review by
vitalization of the clause, it is important to understand the various and
far-reaching theoretically possible applications of equal protection and
the manner in which a vitalization might affect the broader problem of
judicial review. This can appropriately be approached by an examination and comparison of the possible applications of substantive due process
and equal protection to the various statutory means utilized by modem
government in an attempt to regulate the conduct or promote the welfare of its citizens. This is neither an attempt to cover all possible types
of regulatory statutes, nor an effort to survey the past and recent usage
of the clause by the courts.8

POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The major types of regulatory devices to be considered here are:
(1) complete prohibition; (2) entrance into a permitted activity conditioned on compliance with a norm, which will hereafter be referred to
as conditioned entrance; and (3) benefit conditioned on compliance with
a norm, hereafter referred to as conditioned benefit. Each of these types
5. See Dkystra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38, 55-56
(1951). Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L REv.
341 (1949), foresee increased usage of the equal protection clause generally. Id. at 342,
381. Strictly speaking, however, they apparently feel that strong review in the economic
area is not justified. Id. at 372-3. Both of these expressions generally contemplate use
of the clause only in the area in which it has been traditionally applied. Compare note 4,

supra.
6. See Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949), 10 U. oF PrTr. L. REv. 406; 48 MIcH. L. REv. 121. See also
Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv.
91, 117 (1950).
7. See RorrSCHAEFR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456-7 (1939).
8. No attempt will be made to examine the field of taxation, a favorite legislative
implement of regulation, because of numerous special problems involved therein and the
distinctly different treatment accorded taxing statutes by the courts; nor will the problem of criminal sanctions be discussed. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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of regulations involve the problem of classification which, for the purposes of this discussion, can be divided into two general categories, 9
overinclusive and underinclusive. In the former category, the provisions
of the statute apply to a larger group of persons or more types of conduct than is reasonable. In the latter category, the provisions apply to
a smaller group or fewer types than is reasonable.
All regulatory statutes make at least two classifications, one of the
persons regulated, and another of the conduct affected. For example, a
statute which permits only agents on a commission basis to sell fire and
casualty insurance makes one classification which includes only commission agents within the provisions of the statute and another which
includes only the activity of selling fire and casualty insurance.' 0 Even
a statute which prohibits certain conduct to all persons makes two classifications, although the one covering persons regulated can only be overinclusive.
Reasonableness of classification is established by a comparison of
the classification with the purpose of the regulation to determine if the
classification bears a substantial relation to the objectives sought to be
achieved by the legislature."
Complete Prohibition
The area of complete prohibition is best exemplified by a statute
prohibiting some particular activity to all persons. Suppose, for example,
that a Legislature passed a statute prohibiting all persons from the manufacture, distribution, and sale of cigarettes,' 2 in the belief that the consumption of tobacco is detrimental to the health and welfare of its citi9. In addition to overinclusive and underinclusive classifications there is (1) the
classification which is perfectly unreasonable, i.e., where the purpose of the statute
cannot under any interpretation justify application to all persons within the provisions;
(2) the classification which is perfectly reasonable, i.e., where all persons regulated are
properly within the provisions and no one has improperly escaped regulation; (3) the
classification which is both under and overinclusive concurrently. For a complete discussion of classification and related problems see Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 5,
at 347.
10. See Dep't of Insurance v. Schoonover, 225 Ind. 187, 72 N.E.2d 747 (1947), in
which the court invalidated such a statute. The Indiana constitutional provision against
granting special privileges and immunities, see note 3 supra, was argued as a basis for
invalidation. The court based its action on Article I, Section 1.
11. See Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 5, at 346.
12. See Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900), in which the Court upheld such
a statute prohibiting the sale of cigarettes against the charge that it infringed upon the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Compare: "After one year from
the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is
hereby prohibited." U.S. CoxsT.

AmEND.

XVIII, § 1.
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zens and with the purpose of protecting them. If the purpose and belief
of the Legislature as to the facts are accepted as correct, then the classification as to persons regulated is perfectly reasonable, but the classification as to the activity prohibited is not. The statute does not affect the
manufacture or sale of cigars and other forms of tobacco. Thus, the
second classification is underinclusive in that it fails to include within
13
the prohibition cigars, chewing tobacco, and other tobacco products.
An equal protection attack on the underinclusive classification in
the above example would probably be made by a manufacturer or seller
of cigarettes. The contention would be, following the words of the
clause, that the petitioner (in the case of a suit to enjoin enforcement)
or defendant (in the case where the seller is being prosecuted for violation) has been denied equal protection of the laws because, considering
the purpose of the statute, all articles which properly belong within the
regulation are not included. Thus, the petitioner contends it is unfair
and discriminatory to prohibit the sale of one article and not another
where there is no substantial difference between the two for the purposes of the regulation.
It is obvious that an important problem involved in the challenge
is the determination of the purposes or reasons for including the one
article and excluding others. The court at this point may employ one
of three alternatives: conclusively assume that the Legislature had reasons for setting this classification, thus precluding any arguments the
petitioner might have; assume that if any reasons for making the classification are conceivable the Legislature considered them; this could be
negated only by the petitioner showing the complete absence of any
possible reasons; require, after petitioner's showing of unfairness of the
classification to him, the respondent to show what the actual purpose
and reasons of the Legislature were. Under either of the last two alternatives, the court may inject its own subjective feelings regarding the
reasonableness of the classification into its decisions by determining that
whatever reasons advanced by the respondent to sustain the regulation
are irrational.
Notwithstanding wide applicability, due process review comes to
an abrupt end when an attempt is made to utilize it in the underinclusive
situation. If, as in the underinclusive classification example of the prohibition of the sale of cigarettes, the purpose or its validity is unchal13. There, of course, may be good reason for distinguishing between cigarettes and
other forms of tobacco, but in this instance, when on its face the statute is predicated
upon the assumption that the consumption of all forms of tobacco is harmful, the
respondent should have the burden of proving affirmatively that the Legislature considered cigarettes a greater evil.
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lenged (i.e., petitioner admits tacitly that tobacco, and thus cigarettes,
are detrimental to health and ergo cigarettes are justifiably prohibited),
he has been deprived of no right and has no standing to challenge. The
due process argument sometimes used that petitioner has been deprived
of his right to equal protection is, in a sense, circular and would attempt
to place the equal protection clause in the position of a right protected
by the due process clause, thus rendering redundant the Fourteenth
Amendment as written and as originally intended. 14 Due process logically
should not be used to attack an underinclusive classification.
Suppose, however, the Legislature passed a statute prohibiting all
forms of gambling but with the purpose of eliminating commercial or
professional gambling because of its close connection to organized crime
as established by thorough investigation. 15 If the purpose and factual
determinations of the Legislature are accepted as correct then the classification is unreasonable as overinclusive since it includes within its prohibition gambling by nonprofessionals such as church groups which are
in no sense connected with organized crime.'
Equal protection attack on the overinclusive classification in this
example would generally 1" be made by a member of some group which
does not come within the definition of professional gambling. 8 Such a
representative contends that the group's classification within the purview
of the statute is unfair and discriminatory considering the purpose and
reason for passing the act because none of the substantive evils sought
to be eliminated are connected with his organization. The same problems
and procedures with regard to the determination of the legislative pur14. "We also know that the equal protection clause, the only clause of section one
of the Fourteenth Amendment that added new language to the Constitution, was originally regarded as the most basic and sweeping of the three, although they were
admittedly overlapping and duplicatory." Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 5, at 341.
15. In Fairchild v. Schanke, 113 N.E.2d 159 (1953), the Indiana court invalidated
a statute whose stated purpose was ".

.

. recognizing the close relationship between

professional gambling and other crime, to restrain all persons from seeking profit from
gambling activities in this state. . .

."

because it exempted all

"

. .

bona fide religious,

patriotic, charitable, or fraternal clubs. .. ." Id. at 161, 162.
16. The Indiana court in Fairchild v. Schanke, supra note 15, implied that it was
impossible to distinguish between different forms of gambling by incorporating into their
opinion the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Mexico in Harriman Institute v.
Carrie Tingley CC. Hospital, 43 N.M. 1, 6, 84 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1938), where it said
".... the gambling spirit feeds itself with as much relish upon a charity lottery as upon
any other kind. If the average person be consumed with a desire to take a chance and
get something for nothing, it matters not to him whether the promoter makes a profit
or that the profit goes to charity. ..."
17. It should be noted that, traditionally due process and not equal protection has
been used by the courts to review such overinclusive classifications. But see Tussman
and tenBroek, supra note 5, at 351-2; pp. 198-9 infra.
18. Here the court would be faced with the problem of defining professional gambling if such is possible. Compare note 13 szpra.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
pose and reasons pertain to this situation that applied in the underinclusive situation discussed above.
Turning from the equal protection attack to the due process attack
in the overinclusive classification of the gambling statute above one finds
many of the same problems prevalent. The group alleging that it is improperly included within the provisions contends essentially that the
prohibition deprives it of property without due process of law. Since
it is accepted that no activity is completely immune from some type of
regulation, the petitioner here is immediately put to the task of alleging
and proving that such regulation is unreasonable as to it.
Here the petitioner argues by analogy, pointing out groups which
are without the purview of the statute and by maintaining that the petitioner is, with respect to the purpose of the statute, more similar to these
groups than to other groups properly regulated. Thus, petitioner contends since he is more like a group properly outside the regulation, then
he is being wrongfully regulated and, therefore, is deprived of his property without due process. At once the old problem of legislative purpose
arises with the same alternatives available to the court and participating
parties as discussed above with regard to equal protection. However,
in addition to questioning the rational connection between the legislative
purpose and petitioner's inclusion within the regulatory provisions, petitioner may contest the validity of the purpose itself. Under due process
review the petitioner may not only be interested in the determination
whether, given a purpose, he is properly within its scope but also desire
to challenge this regulation in this area regardless of purpose. Consideration of the relation of the purpose to some ultimate public good is necessary.1-9 This procedure enables the petitioner to delve one step further
back into the legislative process and reasoning than equal protection
review.
Conditioned Entrance into an Activity
Entrance into activity conditioned on compliance with a norm is
by far the most frequently employed device within the sphere of economic regulation and is possibly best exemplified by the common license
statute. Thus, entrance into some particular activity or economic endeavor may be allowed only to those who comply with a specified standard
19. This consideration is usually spoken of by the Supreme Court of the United
States in terms of whether the regulation is legitimately within the area reserved to the
State's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, i.e., the "police power".
See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 302, 523-5 (1934).
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or agree to observe a norm of conduct (usually certain requirements
regarding conduct of the activity permitted).20
Suppose that the Legislature passed a statute permitting the sale of
skim milk on condition that no fat or oil not derived from milk fat be
added. 21 This is an example of an activity conditioned on compliance
with a norm of conduct. If, however, the statute permitted bar tending
23
only by men,22 or allowed pool rooms to be operated only by citizens,
it would be an example of an activity conditioned on possession of a
24
personal characteristic.
It must be noted that a unique relationship between the concepts
of over and underinclusive classification becomes apparent upon close
examination and comparison of their connection with either "burdens"
or'"benefits" within the three major areas of regulation. This relationship stands out most clearly in the area of conditioned entrance; a statute
which places a burden on one group confers, in a sense, a benefit on all
those outside of the burdened group. The statute which permits only
men to tend bar is a benefit statute as to men, and a burden statute as to
women. Therefore, this statute, when examined from the burden viewpoint, is overinclusive; i.e., assuming a purpose to protect the health and
morals of women, not all women bartenders are properly included since
not all women are more susceptible to moral corruption than men. Consequently, the statute may be looked upon as being an overinclusive burden.
When, however, the statute is analysed from the benefits viewpoint, the
classification is underinclusive; i.e., assuming the same purpose, the
privilege of tending bar is not extended to all those reasonably qualified
20. This "standard" may be one of three forms: (1) a "closed" characteristic such
as race, sex, or color into or from which it is impossible to enter or leave; (2) a retroactive or "test oath" characteristic such as former membership in some particular
organization, which as to those who were members is like a closed characteristic but
as to others only forewarns of the disability connected with membership and may have
the effect of deterring them from becoming members; (3) an "open" characteristic,
such as requirements regarding, one's education or passing an exam, which essentially
involve the acquisition of some particular attribute which generally is within the attainment of all persons.
21. See Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32 (1944), where the
Court upheld such a statute even though it was admitted that the compound added was
more nutritious than plain skim milk. This type of statute is usually couched in terms
of a prohibition; ie., the addition to skim milk of fats or oils not derived from milk fat
is prohibited to all those desiring to sell skim milk. Although this is not strictly a
license statute it is very similar since entrance into and continued pursuance of a specific
activity is conditioned on compliance with a norm of conduct.
22. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), in which the Court upheld a
Michigan statute which permitted only male bartenders, except that women were permitted where the bar was owned by their husband or father.
23. See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927), where such a
statute was upheld.
24. See note 20 supra.
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to serve in this capacity. Because the benefit is not distributed over a
sufficiently broad area, it too is underinclusive.
To examine the equal protection argument, assume the filled milk
statute imposes an underinclusive burden; i.e., the enumeration of nonpermitted additions fails to include other elements equally as undesirable
considering a general purpose of protecting consumers from fraud and
unwholesome products. The petitioner would contend that such a statute
is unfair and discriminatory since it regulates one group while overlooking certain activities which render another group equally as susceptible
to governmental control. 25 It is obvious that here, as in the underinclusive classification of the complete prohibition type regulation, the problem of determining the legislative purpose and reasons for establishing
the classification must be handled by the court. It is equally clear that
the same alternative procedures are available to the court and that the
change in the type of regulation has caused no new problems.
Here also, as in the complete prohibition type regulation, the due
process clause logically cannot be used if the classification is underinclusive. So long as petitioner does not deny the fact that he is properly
within the regulatory provisions, the classification cannot be challenged
by due process review.
If the filled milk statute is to be considered overinclusive, on grounds
perhaps that while some nonmilk fat or oil additions are harmful not
all are, the petitioner desiring to use equal protection will logically contend that his additaments are similar to those which are nonharmful.
Thus, petitioner argues that, his additions being more like those properly
not prohibited, a refusal to allow him to add ingredients is discriminatory
and denies him equal protection of the laws. Again, the court is faced
with the problem of determining the legislative purpose and reasons for
establishing the classification. The basic issue is, as before, the rationality
of petitioner's inclusion within the regulatory provisions.
Due process objections to overinclusive classification correspond to
the usual due process attack in other areas ;28 i.e., the petitioner contends
that his right to add certain ingredients to milk can only be denied by
showing some valid purpose. However, a facet of due process review
of this type of regulation has been habitually overlooked by the courts,
who often neglect to consider the activity regulated. In the situation above
25. The actual existence of such group susceptible to regulation may be made a
requirement to the establishment of an unfair classification. In that situation the petitioner would have the burden of alleging and proving such existence. See the discussion
of this possible requirement at p. 205 infra.
26. For a summary of the usual due process attack see the discussion at p. 194
sz pra.
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petitioner contends he has an interest in the nature of a right to add certain ingredients. He assumes that he also has a right to sell milk, but that
assumption may not be valid. This discrepancy is emphasized when the
activity permitted is conditioned on compliance with some requirement
which would cause petitioner to relinquish or curtail the exercise of a
constitutional right. For example, petitioner might be allowed to sell
milk only if he agrees to relinquish all connections with a religious group.
Can petitioner logically challenge this regulation under due process review ?2 He must give up religious freedom only if he wishes to sell milk.
Perhaps engaging in the sale of milk is a privilege which may be withheld by governmental action.
To deny a petitioner any standing to challenge this type of regulation under due process by no means precludes his opportunity to contest
the provision's validity under equal protection; the establishment of a
right to enter the activity regulated is unnecessary, because equal protection review goes only to the rationality of the classification.28 However, perhaps due to the unfamiliarity of the courts and many legal
scholars with the potential applications of equal protection and an innate
notion that a remedy for such inequity must be found, due process review has been used frequently to invalidate such regulation. The argument briefly made has been that while petitioner has no unconditional
right to sell milk, he does have a right to sell milk modified only by
reasonable conditions. 9 Another closely related argument is that what
27. "This bargaining away of'my 'constitutional rights' is done under compulsion;
but the compulsion can be effective only if, in my own estimation, the surrender of my
constitutional right is less harsh than the prohibition to do the other acts to which I have
no constitutional right ... This doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, as so stated, is
difficult to support logically. If I have no ground for complaint at being denied a

privilege absolutely, it is difficult to see how I acquire such a ground merely because
the state, instead of denying me a privilege outright, offers me an alternative, however
harsh." Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COL. L. REV.
321, 322 (1935) ; see also Merrill, Unconstitutional Condition, 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 879
(1929), in which the author expresses the opinion that receipt of a privilege may be
conditioned upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right. He would, however, distinguish between those constitutional guarantees set up primarily for the benefit of the
individual (due process, equal protection) and those constitutional provisions bound up
with the working of our system of federal government. Merrill would not permit the
bartering away of the latter constitutional provisions since the operation of the governmental system set up by the Constitution is involved.
28. See Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comn'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), in
which the Court upheld a Louisiana statute which, for practical purposes, limited the
occupation of pilot for the port of New Orleans to relatives and friends of present
pilots. The Court, while declining to invalidate the statute, did accept the applicability
of equal protection review. In dissent, four members of the Court expressed their firm
conviction that equal protection not only applied but that the statute should have been
invalidated as a violation of that clause. The decision was severely criticized in Note,
56 YALE L.J. 1276 (1947), but see Note, 23 IND. L.J. 204 (1948).
29. In Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). a California
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is actually being denied by such a regulation is not the petitioner's right
to sell milk (which admittedly'may not even be a right) but petitioner's
right to freedom of religion.
It is true that the practical effect of this type of regulation may be
to force a person who desires to pursue a certain activity to relinquish
a constitutional right, but due process review here must always rest on
the possibility that a court will accept the proposition that this amounts
to depriving a person of a right. Here, as in all other comparisons between
due process and equal protection, there exists a difference in coverage
since equal protection will only question the rationality of the classification while due process may challenge the basic validity of the purpose.
Once the initial 'privilege' gap is bridged, or ignored as is usually the
case, due process may be used to penetrate more deeply into the legislature's motives and intent, often substituting in the process the courts'
value judgments for that of the legislature. For the practicing lawyer,
it is undoubtedly important to know the apparently favored due process
mode of attack, but it is also important to understand the strained nature
of such a position and a logically more suitable contention.
When entry into a particular activity is conditioned on compliance
with some closed standard or personal characteristic such as race, color,
or sex, a problem arises which is closely analagous to the example above
in which the sale of milk is conditioned upon relinquishing the constitutional right to religious freedom. The only difference is that here the
regulated party cannot change his status and, thus, cannot enter the
statute required every motor carrier for hire to obtain a certificate of convenience and
necessity in order to use the state highways. Acceptance of this certificate subjected
them to obligations placed on common carriers-obligations to render service, with certain exceptions, to all applicants and to charge only reasonable rates. Mr. Justice Sutherland declared that the state's power to condition the grant of a privilege did not include
the power to impose conditions which would require the surrender of a constitutional
right. This statement proved too broad even for Justice Sutherland, however, and in
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932), he declared that unconstitutional conditions could be compelled by threat to withhold a privilege provided it is related to the
purposes which generally justify withholding such privilege. In the Stephenson case a
Texas statute forbade private contract carriers to use the state highways unless they
charged rates no lower than those charged by common carriers. In sustaining the regulation Justice Sutherland said: "Here the circumstances which justifies what otherwise
might be an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of private contract is that
the contract calls for a service, the performance of which contemplates the use of
facilities belonging to the state; and it would be strange doctrine which, while recognizing
the power of the state to regulate the use itself, would deny its power to regulate the
contract so far as it contemplates the use." Id. at 274. The doctrine of privileges conditioned on the forfeiture of "constitutional rights" has been transplanted to contemporary
decisions involving numerous and diversified subjects, in many instances with less judicial
restraint even than under the doctrine of the Stephenson case. For a survey of these
cases and the dangers involved in the present approach, see Note, 28 IND. L.J. 520 (1953).

NOTES
activity regardless of what actions he may take or what freedoms he
may be willing to surrender.
Classifications based on closed characteristics have been one of the
most frequently reviewed types of regulation under equal protection.
They seem to fall naturally into what has been called "forbidden" or
"suspect" classification.3 0 It has been asserted that, ". . human equality
is closely associated with the denial that differences in color or creed,
birth or status, are significant or relevant to the way in which men should
be treated. These factors, the egalitarian asserts, are irrelevant accidents
in the fact of our common humanity." 31 As Mr. Justice Jackson has
said in speaking of a classification based on the criterion of indigence,
"[t]he mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color."' 3 2 With regard to the

identity of closed classifications and civil rights, Mr. Justice Black has
stated, "[i]t should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.
It is to say that the courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." 33
Thus, it will be observed that the closed characteristic used as a basis
for classification approaches what is vaguely termed a civil right or liberty, either because of the "liberty" or "right" abridged, such as speech
34
or religion, or because of the nature of the classification itself.
In both under and overinclusive situations involving closed classifications, equal protection review is applicable in the same manner and
form as in the other regulation areas discussed. Again, due process is
totally inapplicable in the underinclusive burden situation and is inapplicable, though in practice it is much used as a means of attack, in the overinclusive burden situation where the activity is considered a privilege. 35
30. See Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 5, at 353, 356.

31. Id. at 353.
32. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941).
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
34. For a discussion of the problem of and reasons for protecting minorities and
the contest involved between the concept of equality of man and the concept of majority
rule involved in democratic theory, see HALE, FxExDom THROUGH LAW 543 et seq.
(1952); MCCLOSKEY, AmER cAN CONSERVATIS M IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 3 (1951);
Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ.1 (1942).
35. It will be noted that, with regard to the possible due process attacks on statutes
which condition entrance into an activity on the relinquishing of some undoubted right,
the question arises as to whether the activity to which entrance is sought is a right or
privilege. The determination as to what is a right or what is a privilege has no absolute
formula and generally will depend upon one's own philosophy of such things as life,
society, the role of government in society, and natural rights. It must be admitted in
this regard that many activities which would have been termed inalienable rights without
hesitation fifty or seventy-five years ago are today considered by a sizeable portion of
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Conditioned Benefit
The type of government regulation which may be termed the area
of a conditioned benefit involves the granting of some tangible benefit,
such as money or govermental jobs, to persons who either agree to comply with a certain norm of specified conduct (which may involve relinquishing a constitutional right or possess some closed characteristic)
or conform to a specific standard of achievement (an open characteristic).
The area of conditioned benefit is identical with the area of conditioned entrance into an activity except in one respect: In the former
area some benefit such as receipt of public funds is substituted for permission to enter into a certain activity of the latter area. The benefit
withheld is always something within the physical control of the government whereas the entrance into an activity is only within the legal control of the government. Thus, the only sanction necessary upon noncompliance with the norm of conduct in the conditioned benefit area is
simply withholding the benefit; while in the area of conditioned entrance,
it is necessary to provide an affirmative sanction upon noncompliance
with the norm because of the possibility of entrance into the activity
without governmental permission or license. This difference between the
two areas may account for the more universal acceptance of the receipt
of a benefit as a pure privilege which may be controlled by the government.
With this one exception the problem and available modes of attack
in the conditioned benefit area are the same as in the area of conditioned
entrance into an activity.
For example, suppose the Legislature passed a statute prohibiting
those who received governmental jobs from entering into any political
activity; a governmental employee would not be permitted to make a
society as only privileges entrance into which may be withheld by the government or
any other properly authorized group.
The transition from right to privilege may be described as a spectrum with a pure
or absolute right at one end and a pure privilege or benefit at the other. There will be
varying gradations in between with different activities possessing differing degrees of
the attributes of right and privilege. Note in this regard the difference, with respect to
the relative possession of the attributes of right or privilege of such things as the "right'
(privilege) to have a government job, such as a policeman, and finally the "right" (privilege) to receive money benefits from the public treasury.
The distinction between "right" and "privilege" may appear nebulous, when it is
seen that under equal protection review the premise is that a privilege ought not to be
denied a person in an irrational manner just as a right may be conditioned only in a
rational manner. The essential difference lies, however, in that, while a privilege may
not theoretically under equal protection be denied one person and granted another in an
irrational manner, it could possibly be completely denied to all persons. Such would
not be true in respect to a right, even a so-called conditional right.
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speech supporting any particular candidate for public office. The sanction
for violation of such a regulation would be removal from the governmental position.
Under an equal protection attack, the petitioner, who desired a
governmental job but was unwilling to surrender his right of free speech
in political matters, would contend that he was unequally excluded from
the benefit. If the purpose of such a statute is assumed to be to guarantee
fair and impartial governmental service, he would contend that there are
others engaged in activities which are just as likely to obstruct impartial
service as political speeches and that it is unfair to exclude petitioner
and not the others. This is an overinclusive benefit classification. 3 6
However, under the same statute petitioner may contend that the
purview of the benefit provision is too narrow (i.e., that making political
speeches is an improper reason for excluding petitioner from the benefit
because it is like those activities properly permitted governmental em37
ployees). This is, of course, an underinclusive benefit classification.
Again the old problem of determining the legislative purpose arises
and necessitates an investigation into the rationality of the reasons for
making the classification. As in the other two general areas of regulation, the court is presented with the same alternatives regarding their
determination of the purpose and rationality of the classification.
Under a due process attack on the underinclusive benefit classification, the rights-privileges problem again arises to plague the person contesting his exclusion from a particular benefit. Assume a statute which
gives compensation to all unemployed persons except those who are or
have been members of the Communist party. 38 Those who seek due
process review of such a statute begin by neglecting or ignoring the
question of whether one has a right to receive governmental funds and
concentrate on the norm or standard conditioning receipt of the funds.
However, the question, does anyone have a right to governmental
funds, persists. If it is proper to withhold the funds altogether, it is not
36. The overinclusive "benefit" classification corresponds to the underinclusive "burden" classification since in both situations petitioner, while admitting his own position
with respect to the statute is proper, contends that the position of other persons similar
to petitioner is improper with regards to the statute and that this difference in treatment
is a denial of equal protection. For a discussion of this unique relationship, see p.

195 supra.
37. The underinclusive "benefit" classification corresponds to the overinclusive
"burden" classification since in both situations petitioner contends he is improperly
classified with regard to the statute because of his similarity to a person differently
but properly classified with regard to the statute.
38. This type of statute was reviewed by an Ohio court in Dworken v. Collopy,
56 Ohio Abs. 513, 91 N.E.2d 564 (1950). The court held the exclusion valid as against
challenges that it was a bill of attainder and an infringement of the right of free
speech. See Notes, 28 IND. L.J. 492 (1953); 28 IND. L.J. 520, 532 (1953).
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improper to withhold them conditionally. Those who desire to use due
process in this situation are cognizant of these arguments but insist that
the practical effect of such conditions is to deprive persons of their rights
such as freedom of speech, thought, conscience, and assembly. Furthermore, they contend that it is the denial of these freedoms or rights that
is being attacked through due process review.
Again, it is not contended that such conditioning of benefits upon
relinquishing constitutional rights does not have the practical effect of
tempting or compelling many of those affected to forego their constitutional freedoms to receive the benefit. The equal protection clause affords
full opportunity to review completely the challenged classification without becoming entangled in the rights-privileges controversy.

JUDICIAL REVIEW:
LIMITATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
It may seem peculiar that counsel would attempt to secure, or courts
utilize, due process review in the areas of conditioned entrance and
conditioned benefit when the question of privilege is involved. One
possible explanation for this usage is the argument advanced by contemporary advocates of due process review, which essentially is that
some means must be found to review and invalidate certain statutory
inequities in the privilege category and that due process has been and
can, no matter how illogically, be used to achieve this end. Another
explanation is the insistence that what is, for practical purposes, being
denied is the right which has had to be relinquished to receive the privilege and that, therefore, due process may be used to review directly this
denial. Here, as generally, it seems plausible that the basic reason behind
this use of due process review is traditional usage and precedent."9
39. It is an historical fact that equal protection has been stigmatized as "the
last resort of constitutional lawyers." Its application in the review of economic regulation has been consistently denied from its judicial inception in the Slaughterhouse Cases
to the present day. In sharp contrast to the relative desuetude of equal protection
is the history of due process review. After a comparatively hesitant early usage, due
process flourished mightily during the period from 1890 to 1937 as the cornerstone
of judicial protection of private property and the concept of "natural rights." Due
process was the implement of review which the Court used to ride roughshod over a
myriad of legislative attempts at regulation in the economic area. It is not at all
surprising therefore that counsel and the courts in search of a means to strike at
statutory inequities in the conditioned benefit area of regulation fell naturally upon
the 'tried and proven' vehicle-due process review.
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873), Mr. Justice Miller, for
the Court, held the clause was inapplicable, saying: "It [the equal protection clause]
is so clearly a provision for that [the Negro] race and that emergency, that a strong
case would be necessary for its application to any other." Id. at 81. The clause has
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However, it was in consideration and contemplation of the effect
of traditional usage of due process which lead eventually to its repudiation as an implement of review in the economic area. This took place
within the broader shift in the Supreme Court's concept of the proper
limits and function of judicial review in a democratic society. Since
1937 the Court has looked with disfavor upon the use of due process to
delve into legislative motives. 40 It is for this reason, among others, that
various legal scholars have felt that equal protection might prove a likely
successor to due process in the economic area. 41 The assumption was
made that the Court would be far more willing to accept equal protection as an implement of review because it would not be forced to reverse
itself by a return to due process and because it was felt that equal protection would not so easily. allow a court to inject its own economic
philosophy.
It is true that equal protection review does not question the validity
of the statute's purpose nor does it lend itself to as penetrating a review
of legislative motives; nevertheless, there are means available to the court
by which it may inject its subjective rationale into its resolution. An
important step in the determination of the rationality of a classification
is ascertainment of the legislative purpose. If, as is true in a majority
of instances, this goal is vague, the court must establish a purpose which
it feels the legislature contemplated; by manipulating purpose, the court
can conclude that a classification is valid or invalid. 42 By broadening
the statute's aim the court provides grounds for an underinclusive attack
or, by narrowing it, gives rise to an overinclusive contention.
occasionally been used in the area of economic regulation, but, in comparison with the
use of due process in the period since 1873, equal protection usage has been infinitesimal.
See, e.g., Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936), in which a statute
regulating the selling of milk was invalidated as being violative of equal protection;
Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936), which held a
statute imposing chain store tax based on gross receipts from sales according to an
accumulative graduated scale to conflict with the requirements of equal protection;
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933), which invalidated a chain store
license tax under the equal protection clause because it laid a tax on chain store
operators graduated according to the number of stores operated under the same general
management in the same county.
40. Although, in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court indicated
a trend by finding a state price regulation of milk not violative of due process, it was
not until West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), that the trend became
firmly established.
41. Cf. Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 5, at 364.
42. A common mode of upholding the validity of a statute is the judicial assumption of the existence of rational and proper legislative reasons for the classification.
See the discussion at p. 192 supra. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948)
the Court said: "Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront
a barmaid without such protecting oversight. This Court is certainly not in a position
to gainsay such belief by the Michiganlegislattirf." (emphasis added)
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It must be admitted that one of the most serious problems faced by
many state courts is the lack of any legislative records of hearings, reports, or debates which would help the court to determine the factual
bases of classification and remedy the absence or ambiguity of the
statute's purpose. 43 The publication of such records, perhaps similar to
Congressional printed committee hearings and reports, plus habitual inclusion of a section indicating purpose in all regulatory statutes might go
far toward relieving this problem. Publication may prove to be objectionable or impossible because of the costs involved in recording and
printing committee hearings and floor debates. There could be little valid
objection to the inclusion of a purpose section on cost grounds, however, there are other reasons militating against adoption of this proposal
unconnected with cost. It may be difficult to establish any clearcut statutory purpose when the act is the product of differing and possibly conflicting interests. Statutes are probably sometimes passed only because
their purposes are subject to varying interpretations.
If the legislature is able to express an unambiguous purpose, the
court may still find that this is not the "real" purpose and proceed on
its own to ferret out the statute's actual goal. The judiciary has, on the
other hand, several devices which may be utilized to avoid or make more
difficult the invalidation of what might be an improper classification.
These devices comprise primarily certain rules used to determine the
validity of a classification and certain pleading requirements enforced
against the petitioner. Probably the most comprehensive statement of
the various rules is that made by Justice Van Devanter writing the
majority opinion in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.

44

"1. The equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment
does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope
of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when
43. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951), expressed a somewhat different view. Discussing specifically the propriety in going back of the language of a statute to the
legislative history, he said: "Resort to legislative history is only justified where the
face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond
Committee reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared ...
But to select casual statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor
or accuracy, as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact
is to substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important functions. . . . It is
the business of Congress to sum up its own debates in its legislation. Moreover, it is
only the words of the bill that have presidential approval, where that approval is
given. It is not to be supposed that, in signing a bill, the President endorses the whole
Congressional Record. For us to undertake to reconstruct an enactment from legislative history is merely to involve the Court in political controversies which are qlite
proper in the enactment of a bill but should have no place in its interpretation."
44. 220 U.S. 61 (1910).
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it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
"2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
inequality.
"3. When the classification in such a law is called in question if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed.
"4. One who assails the classification in such a law must
carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." 45
In addition to the rules enunciated by Justice Van Devanter, others
are frequently used: The Legislature may remedy a little evil at a time,
or for some administrative reasons, 46 an enforcement agency may enforce
a regulation as to a single group at a time (thus sanctioning underinclusive classification and enforcement). 47 The Legislature may eliminate
the main evil, thus discriminating against the one particular class from
which the specific evil is mainly to be feared. 48 The Legislature may
discriminate between degrees of harm, hitting the most flagrant aspects
of an evil without hitting evils of the same class but of lesser magni49
tude.
The pleading strictures might consist of requiring the petitioner to
show the actual existence of persons within the class not regulated or
the class receiving a benefit.50 He could be forced to demonstrate actual
45. Id. at 78. For a recent usage of this rule and Justice Sutherland's statement
of it, see Pyeatte v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 102 F.Supp.
407 (W.D. Okla. 1952).
46. While the administrative justification excuse has generally been used in the
underinclusive situation, there is no reason -why some of these justifications could not
be used in the overinclusive situation, for example, the excuse that the Legislature
cannot be expected to draw such a fine line that no one may be improperly regulated.
Compare Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 5, at 348-9.
47. See, e.g., Semler v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1934);
Mackey v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919); Broad-Grace v. Bright, 48 F.2d 348 (E.D.
Va. 1931), aff'd, 284 U.S. 588 (1931).
48. See e.g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) ; Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1939) ; Farmers
& Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 262 U.S. 649 (1922).
49. See Hall v. Geiger Jones, 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
50. In Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 84 (1945), the Court in
refusing to invalidate a New York statute compelling lodging houses constructed before
1944 to comply with certain requirements said, "[t]he difficulty is that appellant has
not shown that there are in existence lodging houses of that category which will escape
the law. The argument is based on an anticipation that there may come into existence
a like or identical class of lodging houses which will be treated less harshly. But so
long as that class is not in existence, no showing of lack of equal protection can possibly
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financial injury because of benefits given his competitors or because the
regulatory burden has caused petitioner's business to fail. 5' If equal
protection is to be taken as a demand for reasonable classification, these
requirements may not logically be necessary, although they might be
implied from the historical context of the clause. They may be utilized
by a court to make less easy the invalidation of legislation or may be
ignored making invalidation easier.
It becomes apparent after a study of the various possible uses of
due process and equal protection that the only real solution to the problem of extra-stringent judicial review is judicial self-restraint and not
resort to a mode of examination which does not include evils associated
with a former, now disfavored, implement of review. Equal protection,
in addition to its own exclusive area of coverage, may properly be used
to challenge enactments traditionally attacked by due process. It is also
applicable to benefit statutes in which due process contentions may encounter difficulty because of the judicial determination that a right is
not involved.
Equal protection is no nostrum for the problem of stringent judicial
review; it can be manipulated with as much facility as was due process
during the half century before 1937.

EMINENT DOMAIN: INTERGOVERNMENTAL
CONFLICTS
Since the close of the American frontier, the country has had a
constant land area while at the same time the need for land by industry
and government has continued to grow. Consequently there is a growing
contest for available realty, and occasionally public property will be
required to meet their expanding needs.' It is clear that private property
be made.... The point is that lack of equal protection is found in the actual existence
of an invidious discrimination, not in the mere possibility that there will be like or
similar cases which will be treated more leniently." But cf. Needham v. Proffitt, 220
Ind. 265, 269, 41 N.E.2d 606, 608 (1942), where the Indiana Supreme Court allowed an
undertaker, who was not permitted under a mortician's licensing statute to advertise
in newspapers, to plead, as grounds for invalidation, the discrimination between newspapers and radio advertising. There was no allegation or proof of the existence of any
class of undertakers using radio advertising.
51. See First National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 289 U.S. 60, 65 (1932).
It will be found, as a practical matter, that the person attacking a statute as discriminatory will have been injured in some manner, albeit indirectly, by the statute.
1. The total federally owned land in continental United States is 455,146,726 acres
or 23.89 percent of the total land area. In Nevada the federal government owns 84.71
percent of the land area while in Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, and Ohio the

